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There has been much interest in group judgment and the so-called ‘wisdom of crowds’. In
many real world contexts, members of groups not only share a dependence on external
sources of information, but they also communicate with one another, thus introducing cor-
relations among their responses that can diminish collective accuracy. This has long been
known, but it has—to date—not been examined to what extent different kinds of commu-
nication networks may give rise to systematically different effects on accuracy. We argue
that equations that relate group accuracy, individual accuracy, and group diversity (see
Hogarth, 1978; Page, 2007) are useful theoretical tools for understanding group perfor-
mance in the context of research on group structure. In particular, these equations may
serve to identify the kind of group structures that improve individual accuracy without
thereby excessively diminishing diversity so that the net positive effect is an improvement
even on the level of collective accuracy. Two experiments are reported where two struc-
tures (the complete network and a small world network) are investigated from this per-
spective. It is demonstrated that the more constrained network (the small world
network) outperforms the network with a free ﬂow of information.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Interaction with others in different social groups is an
essential part of the human condition. As members of a
jury we deliberate with fellow jurors in order to arrive at
an appropriate verdict, as members of a legislative body
we interact with others to create and repeal laws, and as
members of research groups we pool our resources so that
we jointly can perform better than we can do individually.
We frequently trust the verdicts and estimates of our
groups, even in cases where they are in conﬂict with our
own. The well-foundedness of this trust has been the sub-
ject of much research in social psychology. Early on, Galton
(1907) famously compared the accuracy of a group withthat of its members in guessing the weight of an ox during
a stock and poultry exhibition. During subsequent decades,
social psychologists carried on in this tradition by compar-
ing groups with their members on a variety of tasks, from
the estimation of room temperature, to the judgment of
children’s intelligence from photographs, to the solution
of mathematical problems (see, e.g. Knight, 1921; Shaw,
1932, for extensive reviews see Gigone & Hastie, 1997;
Hill, 1982; Lorge & Brenner, 1958). The bottom line of
much of this was that, on the one hand, results could not
really be made sense of without formal statistical tools,
and, on the other, that once these were properly utilized,
much of these earlier results seemed trivial.
In the words of Gigone and Hastie (1997).
Statistical combinations of judgments have long been
known to cancel out unsystematic judgment error
1 It should be noted that understanding validity in terms of a correlation
results in a fairly coarse-grained concept of validity. For instance, assume
that Bob and Sue have answered in the following way:
Bob Sue Correct
Question 1 13 5 5
Question 2 15 7 7
Question 3 11 3 3
Question 4 13 5 5
On the correlational understanding of validity, Bob’s and Sue’s answers
are, counterintuitively, equally valid (both answers are perfectly corre-
lated with the correct answer). This might be what Hogarth is after
when he remarks that his results only hold in circumstances where
‘the judgmental task consists of rank ordering alternatives—that is the
level of judgment is not important.’ (Hogarth, 1978: 41, emphasis in
original). Nonetheless, even when the exact values are important for a
correct answer, the correlation between a sequence of answers and
the correct answers gives us an indication of how good the answers
are; answers that are very poorly correlated with the correct answers
cannot be correct.
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eral judgments is smaller than the standard deviation of
the judgments themselves; groups almost inevitably
outperform their members simply by averaging those
members’ judgments. Such accuracy gains can hardly
be attributed to anything special about the group judg-
ment process; the group need not meet at all.
Gigone and Hastie (1997: 159)
So the real question of group research must be the
extent to which the group is better than the statistical
aggregate (Gigone & Hastie, 1997). Or, to put this differ-
ently, what is it that the group adds?
One way of approaching this question is to manipulate
communication channels within a group and examine
attendant effects. Experimental manipulation of the infor-
mation participants receive from others allows inference
about the extent to which they use that information. It
thus provides a methodological window into how people
go about combining what they believe with information
they receive from others.
This question seems at least as relevant now as it did in
the early days of small group research, because it has
become ever more apparent that our beliefs and opinions
are determined not merely by our own observations, but,
to an arguably even greater extent, by the evidence we
receive through the testimony of others (see e.g., Coady,
1992). Consequently, there is only so much one can study
about human learning, judgment and decision making
without taking into account the social dimension of belief
formation (see also, Goldstone & Gureckis, 2009).
This in turn suggests a subtle shift in emphasis concern-
ing the kinds of groups and tasks that are of interest and
what aspects of group inﬂuence and performance seem
most worthy of examination. Much of the past research
on groups (as surveyed in the reviews of Gigone &
Hastie, 1997; Hill, 1982; Lorge & Brenner, 1958) has
focussed on the quality of the group response itself, and
this is also the central theme in the recent revival of this
tradition of research under the header of ‘wisdom of
crowds’ (Hertwig, 2012; Herzog & Hertwig, 2009;
Surowiecki, 2004). However, it is at least as interesting
and important to ask what the group does for the individ-
ual, and how this develops, that is, to ask not just how
group performance compares to individual performance
but to ask how both individual and group performance
are changed by group communication.
It is here that useful links can be formed with the bur-
geoning literature on networks, in particular social net-
works (for an introduction see e.g., Jackson, 2010).
Patterns of communication between individuals in groups
give rise to network structure (see also, Goldstone,
Roberts, & Gureckis, 2008; McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl,
2000): depending on context, all members may be
exchanging views and listening to one another freely;
alternatively, only some members may be communicating
directly with one another. Finally, even where all individu-
als hear all information being exchanged, selective atten-
tion and weighting (see e.g., Friedkin & Johnsen, 1999) of
others’ information (determined, for example, by perceived
competence) imposes an effective network structure to thecommunication that diverges from the surface level
whereby everyone is communicating with everybody else.
As just indicated, experimental manipulation of the
structure of communication may provide insight into what
it is that being part of a group is adding. At the same time,
it raises interesting questions of its own concerning the
extent to which different types of communication net-
works may systematically differ in their impact on our
beliefs (on the general beneﬁts of taking a network per-
spective to traditional group research see also, Katz,
Lazer, Arrow, & Contractor, 2004).
To this end, we present two experimental studies
manipulating the communication structure within a group
and examining its impact on the accuracy of participants’
beliefs. To sidestep some of the pitfalls of the early work
on group accuracy, our analysis is informed by two equa-
tions that relate group validity, individual validity and
group diversity. These equations demonstrate—for two dif-
ferent ways of aggregating opinion and two different ways
of understanding accuracy—the conditions under which
the group will outperform its average individual member
by mathematical necessity. First, work by Ghiselli (1964,
chap. 7) and Hogarth (1978) points out that if the validity
of a sequence of estimates is understood in terms of the
correlation between it and the true values, the validity of
the group estimate can be shown to always exceed the
average validity of the answers of the group members as
long as the members are not perfectly correlated with each
other and error is unbiased.
More precisely, if we let n be the number of group
members, sxi ; sx; st be sequences of the estimates of group
member i, mean estimates, and true values respectively,
and qx;y be the correlation between two sequences x and
y, Hogarth’s equation states that1
qst sx ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p Pn
i¼1qst sxi
nﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ðn 1Þ
Pn
i¼1
Pn
j¼iþ1qsxi sxj
n
r ð1Þ
The limiting case where n ¼ 1 is captured by following
equation:
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n!1
qst sx ¼
Pn
i¼1qst sxi
nﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPn
i¼1
Pn
j¼iþ1qsxi sxj
n
r ð2Þ
More generally, the Diversity Prediction Theorem (Page,
2007) indicates that the collective error of a group (mea-
sured as the squared deviation between true value and
group mean) must equal the average individual error
minus the group diversity (measured as the variance
around the mean estimate). It follows directly from the
theorem that as long as there is diversity in the group,
the collective error must always be lower than the average
individual error.
More precisely, if we let n be the number of group
members, xi be the estimate of the group member i; x be
the mean estimate, and t be the true value of whatever is
being estimated, the Diversity Prediction Theorem states
that
ðx tÞ2 ¼
Pn
i¼1ðxi  tÞ2
n

Pn
i¼1ðxi  xÞ2
n
ð3Þ
Both Hogarth’s equation and the Diversity Prediction
Theorem thus make clear that group diversity decreases
collective error: more diverse groups will give rise to more
accurate collective judgment.
Although these equations are of general importance in
research on group interaction, they have not hitherto
informed research on group structure. As a corollary to
our main ﬁndings we hope to demonstrate the usefulness
of these equations not only in understanding data on group
performance, but also on suggesting interesting empirical
predictions and navigating theoretical arguments about
the conditions for successful group interaction.22. A dim view of social interaction
The fact that the group will perform at least as well as
its average individual does not mean that the group always
performs well; if the average individual validity is very low
then so is the group validity. The truth of the equations
described above is thus compatible with the view held by
some researchers, that group interaction is often not very
beneﬁcial. Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, and Helbing
(2011), for instance, adopt this view (see also King,
Cheng, Starke, & Myatt, 2012). In support of their view,
Lorenz et al. report an experiment where participants were
divided into groups of twelve people and asked to answer
questions under three different conditions. Under one of
these conditions, a participant ﬁrst answered a question
on her own, was then given information about what the
other members of the group had answered, and was then
asked to answer the same question again in light of the
new information. This procedure was repeated three more
times. Even though it might be expected that the partici-
pants had excellent opportunity to improve their guesses
under this condition, Lorenz et al. did not ﬁnd any2 For two interesting applications of the Diversity Prediction Theorem to
the ‘collective’ constituted by a single person at different times, see Rauhut
and Lorenz (2010) and Vul and Pashler (2008).signiﬁcant improvement in collective error at any point
during the ﬁve rounds, but did ﬁnd that the group had
became signiﬁcantly less diverse. They concluded that
the group is actually worse off by the end of the ﬁve rounds
than when it starts out, in part due to this loss of diversity
without corresponding decrease in collective error.
It is possibly premature for at least two reasons to adopt
Lorenz et al.’s somewhat pessimistic position on the basis of
their experiment. First, as Farrell (2011) remarks, Lorenz
et al.’s data actually show that the participants improve
individually in the relevant condition, even though there
is no decrease in collective error. In fact, it follows directly
from the Diversity Prediction Theorem that if we have
stable collective error and a decrease in diversity, we must
also have a decrease in the average individual error. So
Lorenz et al.’s experiment did demonstrate that social inter-
action is beneﬁcial at the individual level. Second, in
another of the three conditions (‘‘the aggregate
information-condition’’) in Lorenz et al.’s experiment, par-
ticipants were given the group’s mean answer as feedback
after each individual guess, and in this condition a signiﬁ-
cant decrease in collective error did occur. Our analysis of
their data also shows that the average individual error
decreased signiﬁcantly in this condition. In line with
Lorenz et al.’s own procedure, we concluded this by com-
paring the logarithms of the participants estimates divided
by the true values. In the aggregate information condition
there were 24 groups (six questions answered by four
groups each). The average individual error in the ﬁrst round
was compared with the average individual error in each of
the subsequent rounds. A repeated measures two-tailed
t-test revealed all differences to be signiﬁcant (p < 0:01).
The trends for individual error, collective error and diver-
sity in the aggregate information condition can be seen in
Fig. 1.
This means that in Lorenz et al.’s experiment, one condi-
tion gave rise to signiﬁcant decrease in both collective and
average individual error. So in the two conditions where
participants were given feedback it was only in the full
information condition that the collective error did not
decrease signiﬁcantly (see also Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007).
An appropriate conclusion to draw from Lorenz et al.’s
data is thus that there are conditions in which group per-
formance improves both at the collective level and at the
individual level, but in some groups there is only the latter
kind of improvement. The Diversity Prediction Theorem is
useful here since it straightforwardly suggest an analysis of
the found contrast: it follows from the theorem that if the
diversity of a group decreases about as much as the aver-
age individual error, there is no decrease in collective error.
The full information condition in Lorenz et al.’s experi-
ment, where every participant can see every other partici-
pant, follows this pattern, and the theorem can thus
explain the absence of a decrease in collective error.
Despite the fact that there is decrease in individual error,
the decrease in diversity is so considerable that it negates
the individual improvement.
This analysis raises the very general question of what
properties of groups promote decreases in individual error
without giving rise to excessive decreases in diversity. If
we can identify these properties, we can identify the
Fig. 1. Reanalysis of data from Lorenz et al. (2011): Trends for individual
error, collective error and diversity in the aggregate information condi-
tion. Error bars correspond to ±1 SD.
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they both decrease individual and collective error. In this
paper we will contribute to answering this question in
the context of the research in group structure. As a starting
point, we will use structures that research on networks has
identiﬁed as having independent theoretical interest. We
next provide an overview of research relevant to the ques-
tion of network structure and group performance.3. Groups with a restricted ﬂow of information
Given evidence from simulation for the importance of
network structure for contagion and diffusion (see e.g.,
Kretzschmar & Morris, 1996; Lazer & Friedman, 2007;
Watts, 1999; see Jackson, 2010; for an introduction),
including such processes as information dissemination
(e.g., Doer, Fouz, & Friedrich, 2012), it seems reasonable
to assume that network structure would be found to inﬂu-
ence actual judgments by real people. However, there has
so far been no experimental study of the impact of network
structure on estimation tasks such as those that have been
the focus of research on group inﬂuence and ‘wisdom of
crowds’.
There are, however, two decades worth of experimental
studies that manipulated network structure in the context
of collective problem solving, ﬁnding evidence for a causal
role of network topology (for a review see e.g., Shaw, 1964;
for a brief summary see also, Levine & Moreland, 2012; for
recent work resuming aspects of this tradition, see Kearns,
2006). In the classical work in this tradition, founded by
Leavitt (1951) and Bavelas (1950), participants were
assigned to laboratory-based, ad hoc groups within the
context of an apparatus that constrained communication
channels. For example, participants were seated such that
they were screened off from each other by dividers and
could communicate only via written messages passed
through slots in these dividers. The task participants faced
were simple collective problem solving tasks which
required the combination of information held across par-
ticipants for their solution. For example, each participant
might receive a hand of ﬁve cards each displaying a differ-
ent symbol, and the collective task was to identify the onesymbol shared by all. The key experimental manipulation
in these studies was the network structure of the commu-
nication channels: for example, chain-like arrangements
were contrasted with wheel (circle), and star-like conﬁgu-
rations with a central actor. Typical dependent variables of
study were not only performance indicators such as time
taken to complete the task and error rates, but also degree
of satisfaction with group membership and measures of
leadership within the group. In general, the theoretical
emphasis within this tradition was on centralization and
the role of putative leaders on group performance (see also
Freeman, Roeder, & Mulholland, 1979).
While there are indeed many real-life problems that
require collective problem-solving in this sense, that is,
the combination of skills or information held uniquely by
different individuals in order to achieve a particular goal
as a group, that is, a single problem-solving unit, this by
no means delimits the role of social inﬂuence and groups
in everyday life. In particular, in the context of belief and
opinion formation, our goals are, in ﬁrst instance, individ-
ualistic: it is the accuracy/informedness of our own beliefs
and opinions that we care about, not how those opinions
might contribute to ‘collective knowledge’ of the group.
In forming those beliefs, we may choose to consult the
views of others, but it is not necessary that we do so.
Needless to say, as social beings it is often also of great
importance to us that we inﬂuence the beliefs and opinions
of others, and it may on many occasions be of importance
for us to do so in order to achieve our goals, which may
require some form of collective action. However, it is our
contention that it is characteristic of human beings that
they acquire information even where there are no immedi-
ate actions apparent that may follow from that knowledge,
and that in those contexts too, social inﬂuence is pervasive.
In keeping with this, we wished to study the impact of
others on a purely knowledge based estimation task which,
though it exposed people to others’ opinions did not
require them to consider those opinions in any way. This
context matches that of much early 20th century small
group research (as discussed in the Introduction above
and in, e.g., Gigone and Hastie (1997)) that was focussed
on accuracy, but that work did not consider network struc-
ture. The previous work most closely related to our aims is
the study by Mason, Jones, and Goldstone (2008) where
different network structures were tested in terms of how
well they supported searches in multimodal problem
spaces. Among the networks tested was the complete net-
work, i.e. the network where everyone can see everyone
else, a small-world network, and a random network, all three
of which are network structures of independent theoretical
interest (more on this below) and examples of which are
given in Fig. 2.
In one of their experiments, Mason et al. (2008) found
that the participants in a small-world network were actu-
ally faster than those in a fully connected network in ﬁnd-
ing a global maximum, that is, the group where the
information channels between its members were
restricted performed better. Although Mason et al.’s expla-
nation of their result does not carry over to the estimation
tasks of present concern, the structures they used are
A Complete Graph
A Small World Graph
A Random Graph
Fig. 2. Network types examined by both Mason et al. (2008) and the
present study.
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be able to capture the contrast between excessively diversity
decreasing networks, and networks that reduce diversity to
a more accuracy enhancing degree.
The Diversity Prediction Theorem entails that collective
error decreases only if the average individual distance to3 Mason et al.’s explanation echoes March (1991) who argued that
homogenous groups do too much exploiting of known solutions and too
little exploring to ﬁnd new solutions (see Lazer & Friedman, 2007 for a
similar simulation result, and a similar explanation). This kind of explana-
tion is only applicable in situations where people are given objective
feedback about the success of their estimate or guess, because the notion of
exploration only makes sense in this context (consider for instance a
completely sensory deprived cartographer).the truth decreases faster than the average individual dis-
tance to the mean. Too much communication may reduce
diversity too much to allow this to happen. Like Mason
et al. we thus examined a complete network as a baseline
with which to check whether ‘more information’ is always
better, given that people are free to ignore parts of it. We
also examined a random network (a so-called Erdos–
Renyi random network as is formed by generating links
independently and randomly with a particular probability
p, Erdos & Rényi, 1959), because these form a common
baseline of comparison in the network literature. Finally,
we examined a small world network (see Watts, 1999;
Watts & Strogatz, 1998), a type of network that is charac-
terized by short paths between nodes and higher cluster-
ing than observed in random graphs, and which seems to
capture not just of a wide variety of biological networks,
but also, most importantly, social networks.4. Experiment 1
In the ﬁrst experiment we studied a percentage estima-
tion task in medium sized groups (N  9) in order to deter-
mine whether networks with more limited connectivity
than the full network would result in decreases in average
individual error without excessive decreases in diversity so
that the net result would be a signiﬁcant decrease in col-
lective error. The experiment also tested the accuracy of
Hogarth equation in the context of interacting groups.
Unlike the Diversity Prediction Theorem—which is com-
pletely general—Hogarth’s equation assumes unbiased
error, and is assumed to apply necessarily only to groups
of non-interacting members, that is, so called ‘staticized
groups’ (see Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977;
Hogarth, 1978). It is thus empirically interesting how well
the equation will fare in circumstances where participants
have some degree of interaction and unbiased error cannot
be guaranteed.5. Method
5.1. Participants
28 undergraduate students (18 male and 10 female) at
Lund University were paid for their participation. In addi-
tion to a ﬂat reward for participation (100 SEK), partici-
pants were incentivized to take the task seriously by a
reward corresponding to three times the participation
reward (300 SEK) to the person in each group with the
most accurate answers. All participants gave written and
informed consent to the experimental procedure.
5.2. Procedure and materials
Each participant signed up for one out of three different
dates, and was tested together with other participants that
signed up for the same date. Each of the resulting groups
(containing 10, 10 and 8 participants respectively) was
tested separately, but the testing conditions, procedure,
materials and instructions were the same across the three
groups.
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seated at a computer and was given two sheets of paper
with instructions. When everyone in a group stated that
they had understood the instructions, a server program
was run which sent out questions to all participants.4
There were thirty target questions in total, and an initial
warm-up question. Each question was asked ﬁve consecu-
tive times over the course of ﬁve consecutive rounds.
During the ﬁrst round, each participant had to answer the
question without any knowledge about what the other par-
ticipants in the room thought the answer was. For the next
four rounds, each participant received information about
what other participants had answered on the previous
round.
Each of the questions was associated with one of the
three network types described above, so that there were
10 questions associated with each network-type. With
the start of the second round of each question, a network
of the appropriate type was randomly generated such that
it contained one node corresponding to each participant.
Participants could then, on the subsequent rounds, see
the answers of the participants corresponding to the nodes
they were immediately connected to. The participants did
not know anything about the overall structure of the net-
work but they were informed that other participants might
be able to see people they themselves could not see.
Furthermore, they were told that every score mattered
equally. The participants were only told the correct
answers after the experiment was over. The winner of each
group was determined by calculating the correlation of
each participant’s sequence of scores with the correct
scores.
We adopted Mason et al.’s (2008) strategy for generat-
ing networks. The complete network was created by gener-
ating nðn 1Þ=2 (where n is the number of nodes) edges so
that every node was adjacent to every other node. The
small-world network was created by ﬁrst connecting all
nodes in a ring, and then randomly combining 30% of the
nodes with another node at least three nodes apart from
it (following the ring path). Finally, the random network
was generated by creating a number of edges equal to
1.3 times the number of nodes under the constraint that
a path should exist between every two nodes. Both the
small-world network and the random network thus have
the same average degree (2:6n=n) and the same link den-
sity (2:6n=ðn  ðn 1Þ).
We devised a set of 31 questions for use in the experi-
ment from reports by Statistics Sweden (‘Statistiska
Centralbyrån’, a well established administrative agency
which supplies the Swedish government and other organi-
zations with statistics) on, for instance, Swedish demo-
graphics, agriculture and geography (all questions are
listed in Appendix A). Except for the warm-up question,
the questions were presented in a random order. The ran-
domization was the same across the three groups.
We had to choose whether to make network-type a
within or a between participant variable. Clearly, question4 The program was written in NetLogo by the ﬁrst author by adapting for
present purposes a program kindly provided by Rob Goldstone, which is
based on routines from Netlogo’s Hubnet sample code.difﬁculty is easier to match if the same question are asso-
ciated with each network structure, but this is possible
only in a between participant design. However, not just
question difﬁculty will vary (and how difﬁcult different
individuals will ﬁnd them), but arguably also how much
people pay attention to the opinions of others may be sub-
ject to individual differences, and this latter factor can be
controlled only by making network structure a within par-
ticipant variable (on the importance of within-group
manipulations in group research see also McGrath et al.,
2000). Consequently, we opted for a within-subjects design
whereby each participant experienced all network struc-
tures. This approach also had the added beneﬁt of allowing
us to test more networks per participant (counterbalancing
the questions across the three network-types would have
required three times as many participants, or alternately,
testing fewer networks). We thus estimated the difﬁculty
of the questions from a pilot study, calculating the average
distance (in percentage points) between the participants’
answers to the questions without feedback and the correct
answer. The questions were then assigned to networks so
that the average difﬁculty of the questions (as estimated
by a pilot-test) and the spread in correct answers from
0–100%were roughly the same for the three networks.
6. Results
The data from the three groups were pooled so that
measures of collective accuracy would reﬂect the judg-
ments of equal numbers of participants. From the pooled
data, the diversity (variance), average individual error
(mean squared error across individuals), and collective
error (squared deviation of the mean answer from the true
value) were calculated for each round for all networks.
There are two ways one could calculate these three quan-
tities: either by directly calculating them from the corre-
sponding 280 data points per network type (28
participants times 10 questions), or by calculating each
quantity ﬁrst for each group and then taking the mean of
those calculations (3 groups times 10 questions). In the
context of this experiment, there is little difference
between these strategies (other than that it slightly boosts
the inﬂuence of the smallest, 8 person group). However, we
used a between participant design in Exp. 2 below, and
there the second strategy seems preferable as it ensures
the integrity of the counter-balancing of questions and
networks. Because we wanted to keep the analysis of both
studies comparable, we used the second method for Exp. 1
also.
The results of these calculations can be seen in Table 1.
As is entailed by the Diversity Prediction Theorem, the
group outperforms the average individual across all net-
work types and rounds, and the difference between the
collective error and the average individual error corre-
sponds to the group diversity.
In general, both individual error and collective error
decreased across consecutive rounds for all network types,
as did the diversity of the raters. However, only some of
these decreases were statistically signiﬁcant. For each net-
work type, the diversity, individual error, and collective
error in the ﬁrst round, were compared to the
Table 1
Experiment 1: Diversity and error, means, by network type (complete
graph, small world network and random network), and judgment round on
a given question.
Network Rnd Diversity Ind. error Col. error
Complete 1 190.0 314.4 124.5
Complete 2 144.0 253.1 109.1
Complete 3 116.4 216.2 99.8
Complete 4 86.7 181.7 95.0
Complete 5 76.0 164.0 88.0
Random 1 256.0 412.7 156.7
Random 2 172.2 318.9 146.7
Random 3 147.9 289.5 141.6
Random 4 143.1 283.7 140.6
Random 5 138.2 269.4 131.2
Small World 1 169.4 464.7 295.3
Small World 2 112.1 419.8 307.7
Small World 3 93.0 385.2 292.2
Small World 4 85.1 371.1 286.0
Small World 5 76.6 366.4 289.8
Table 2
Experiment 1: Comparison between round 1 collective error and collective
error at each subsequent round for each network type, numbers displayed
are p-values for two-tailed t-tests.
Network Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
Complete .087 .232 .107 .076
Random .563 .436 .427 .223
Small World .403 .846 .560 .699
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Paired two-tailed t-tests revealed signiﬁcant decreases in
diversity and average individual error that were main-
tained across subsequent rounds for all network-types (in
all but one case p < .01, and in most cases p < .001).
Comparisons were done across questions and groups (with
resulting df = 29). With respect to collective error,
decreases were not signiﬁcant at the level of the individual
network as can be seen in Table 2 which reports the
corresponding tests for collective error. This, however,
given the trends in the data, reﬂects a lack of statistical
power more than anything else, as is apparent from the
fact that, collectively, across all network types, round 5
error was signiﬁcantly lower than initial (round 1) error,
tð89Þ ¼ 2:13; p ¼ :036.
The data were also analyzed from a correlational per-
spective in order to gauge the accuracy of Hogarth’s Eq.
(2), in the circumstances of this experiment. Across the
three groups, and across the three network types, the
equation predicted the validity of the mean answer (i.e.,
its correlation across questions with the true answer) with
a high degree of accuracy, with a mean prediction error
below .0065. The overall degree of correlation between
the observed validity of the mean answer and the pre-
dicted validity was very high (.99). The accuracy of the
equation was comparable across the three network types.
As is entailed by the equation, the mean validity outper-
formed the average individual validity across rounds and
network-structures.
Finally, we wished to see whether there were conse-
quences of the differences in network structure. A direct
comparison of accuracy (individual or collective) is not
meaningful for these data as the questions (despite our
attempts to balance them) varied in difﬁculty across net-
work types. The mean individual errors were 314, 413
and 465 respectively for the complete network, the ran-
dom network and the small world network. This difference
between these scores suggests that the questions assigned
to the three network types were of uneven difﬁculty, and
that the two constrained networks were associated with
harder questions than the unconstrained network. Twotwo-tailed t-tests revealed that this difference was margin-
ally signiﬁcant between the complete network and the
small world network (tð29Þ ¼ 1:83; p ¼ :072) but not sig-
niﬁcant between the complete network and the random
network (tð29Þ ¼ 1:18; p ¼ :24).
One can, however, ask to what extent network structure
led to correlations between raters, in particular, to what
extent it led to correlations that are not simply reﬂections
of the increase in accuracy. Degree of accuracy constrains
the inter-rater correlation across participants, in that
greater accuracy necessarily means greater inter-rater cor-
relation, even in the case where their estimates are entirely
independent: in the limit where participants’ estimates are
perfectly correlated with the data, they must also be per-
fectly correlated with each other.
However, one can ask to what extent participants’ esti-
mates show correlations above and beyond the level man-
dated by their level of accuracy. Speciﬁcally, we devised a
measure of ‘excess correlation’ that factored out the abso-
lute level of accuracy and could thus be compared across
network structures, indicating the extent to which a net-
work was associated with correlations between partici-
pants that were not validity inducing. Given that the
answers of two participants a and b are both correlated
with the true values to a certain degree, there is an interval
in which their degree of correlation with each other must
lie. The maximum of this interval is the perfect correlation
that would arise if a and b always gave identical answers.
The minimum of this interval is the lowest degree of corre-
lation that could obtain between them without decreasing
their accuracy, that is, the correlations of either (or both) of
their responses with the true answers. All correlation
above this minimum, lowest degree is ‘excess correlation’:
that is, correlation not required for the persons to have
their respective validities. In other words, excess correla-
tion measures the extent to which pairs of raters are more
correlated than they would need to be, given their respec-
tive levels of accuracy.
If the degree of actually observed excess correlation is
normalized (that is, considered as a proportion of the
remaining interval spanned by the minimum necessary
correlation and a perfect correlation of 1), it provides a
measure of correlation excess that can be compared across
different absolute levels of accuracy. So by calculating the
pairwise minimum correlation for all participants (given
their validities) we derived a measure of the excess corre-
lation in each condition (i.e., 1 ð1 qa;b=1 qMina;b Þ) that
ranges from 0 (no excess correlation) to 1 (maximum
excess correlation). On this metric, the complete network
led to the greatest excess correlation (+.1417) closely fol-
lowed by the random network (+.1416), with the lowest
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work (+.1071). This suggests that a complete network, rel-
ative to a small-world network, may increase
inter-dependence between raters beyond the extent to
which it is useful for improving accuracy. We pursued this
question further in Experiment 2.
7. Discussion
Previous research in the context of advice taking has
suggested that participants overweight their own judge-
ment and underweight the responses of others relative to
what would be optimal, and that participants beneﬁt only
from fairly few opinions, becoming less sensitive to the
recommendations or judgments of others as these increase
beyond just a handful of opinions (see Yaniv & Milyavsky,
2007). In line with this, participants in Exp. 1 did not attach
equal weight to their own opinions and those of others.
This is apparent from the fact that participants did not sim-
ply converge on the mean of all answers in round 2 of the
complete network condition. Equally weighting all visible
responses, including one’s own, would be equivalent to
taking the mean of those responses to be one’s revised pre-
diction, with the consequence that individual error would
come to equal collective error on round 2. At the same
time, the fact that individual error remained higher (even
on the last round) than the collective error in the initial
round of independent judgments (round 1) indicates that
participants’ failure to do so came at an accuracy cost. To
this extent, the ﬁndings of Yaniv and Milyavsky (2007),
who showed participants only one round of other
responses, are conﬁrmed in our study. However, it is sur-
prising from the perspective of that research how much
information from others our participants were actually
willing to take in. In particular, diversity decreased round
on round (see Table 1) indicating not only that (at least
some) participants continued to revise their opinions
round after round, but that they did so in a way that was
sensitive to the responses of others.
Our results also illustrate clearly how the formal tools
of the Diversity Prediction Theorem and Hogarth’s equa-
tion can be used to understand the relationship between
collective accuracy, individual accuracy and inter-rater
dependence. Collective accuracy, individual accuracy and
the variability of the individual raters necessarily trade
off, and, all other things being equal, collective error is neg-
atively affected by decreases in variability brought about
by communication.
However, contrary to the slightly negative view
expressed by Lorenz et al. (2011), average individual error
was signiﬁcantly reduced in every round following the ﬁrst
one, even though diversity decreased as a result of infor-
mation exchange. This is in line with the observations
made by Farrell (2011) regarding the (unreported)
individual-level improvements in Lorenz et al.’s data.
Finally, in even starker contrast to the sceptical view on
social interaction of Lorenz et al. (2011) there was a signif-
icant decrease in collective error by round 5 in the overall
data.
From a correlational perspective, it can be concluded
that Hogarth’s equation can be used to make remarkablyaccurate predictions of the validity of the mean answer
based on the average individual validity and the average
interpersonal correlation in the group, even in the case of
explicitly interacting groups. Such interactions may well
serve to accentuate any biases present in participants’
responses, but the equation may be quite robust to viola-
tions of its assumptions (as has also been found in related
work on judgment aggregation by Wallsten, Budescu, Erev,
& Diederich, 1997).
Furthermore, our measure of excess correlation
showed, as predicted, that the complete network increased
more in excess correlation than the more constrained net-
works, with the small world network increasing the least
of the three networks. However, the absolute degree of
excess correlation observed may also be inﬂuenced by
the difﬁculty of questions, and the difference in excess cor-
relation between the complete networks and more con-
strained networks might thus be even more pronounced
when the difﬁculty of questions is the same across the net-
works. Though our measure of excess correlation takes into
account variations in the degree of accuracy, and hence
question difﬁculty, this measure could not take into
account any difference in participant strategy that emerge
as a function of difﬁculty. It seems entirely possible that
the difﬁculty of questions inﬂuences how much people
beneﬁt from social interaction. At one extreme, if no-one
in the group has any information about the correct answer,
interacting socially will generate no beneﬁts. Thus to fur-
ther pinpoint the relative merits of different network
structures, the difﬁculty of questions needs to be more clo-
sely matched. This was done in Experiment 2.8. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was very similar to Experiment 1 but
used the alternative strategy of making network-type a
between participant variable. It thus controlled directly
for differences in the difﬁculty of questions across different
network structures, by having, across groups, all questions
be associated with all networks. It also extended the num-
ber of rounds per question from ﬁve to eight in order to
make sure that trends in average individual error, diversity
or collective error were not interrupted prematurely. In
order to accommodate these changes without the experi-
ment becoming excessively long, only two network-types
were tested, the complete network and the small-world
network, which is the most interesting of the two
restricted networks examined in the last study, given that
real world social networks typically have small world
structure (Watts, 1999).9. Method
9.1. Participants
38 undergraduate students (15 male 23 female) at Lund
University were paid for their participation. The partici-
pants were rewarded and incentivized in the same was
as in Experiment 1. All participants gave written and
informed consent to the experimental procedure.
Table 3
Experiment 2: Diversity and error; means.
Network Rnd Diversity Ind. error Col. error
Complete 1 237.7 401.6 163.9
Complete 2 121.7 249.2 127.5
Complete 3 102.1 227.9 125.8
Complete 4 112.0 238.9 126.9
Complete 5 110.2 234.4 124.2
Complete 6 109.6 246.3 136.7
Complete 7 105.2 233.5 128.3
Complete 8 102.5 230.9 128.4
Small World 1 279.7 411.9 132.3
Small World 2 177.9 263.7 85.8
Small World 3 167.5 248.6 81.2
Small World 4 140.2 209.3 69.0
Small World 5 136.6 204.3 67.7
Small World 6 137.3 207.3 70.0
Small World 7 130.2 194.6 64.4
Small World 8 138.4 213.6 75.2
Table 4
Experiment 2: Collective error: comparison of subsequent rounds to round
1 error, p-values.
Network R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
Complete .070 .111 .172 .169 .384 .230 .248
Small World .008 .029 .007 .006 .009 .005 .008
M.L. Jönsson et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 191–204 1999.2. Procedure and materials
Each participant signed up for one out of four different
dates, and was tested together with the other participants
that signed up for the same date. Each of resulting groups
(containing 9, 9, 7 and 13 participants respectively) was
tested separately. The testing conditions, procedure, and
instructions were the same across the four groups.
The testing arrangement was very similar to that used
in Experiment 1 except for the fact that each participant
answered each question eight times (rather than ﬁve)
and the fact that there were only twenty target questions
in total (a subset of the questions used in Experiment 1).
Moreover, each of the questions was associated with one
of only two network types: the complete network and
the small world network. There were 10 questions associ-
ated with each network-type. The question-network asso-
ciation was counter-balanced across groups so that the set
of questions that groups 1 and 2 answered from the per-
spective of the complete network were answered from
the small-world network by groups 3 and 4 and vice versa.5 We did not include error-bars in Figs. 3–5 for the following reasons: In
the case of collective error, they do not provide meaningful insight into
group level performance. Given that the collective error represents a mean
of only four groups, the standard deviation seems meaningful only if one
were to also include the variability across questions. In this case, though,
the error bars would simply reﬂect the differences in question difﬁculty
across a set of questions that were intentionally chosen to vary in difﬁculty.
By contrast, average individual error—shown in Fig. 4—is a quantity that
exhibits variation even within a question. However, that variability is
explicitly represented by the diversity plot of 5, thus making error bars
redundant.
6 p values for individual error comparing round 2 to round 4 for the small
world network: .01; for collective error: .03. The small-world network
continues to show sporadic improvement beyond round 3 but there are no
clear trends like those for rounds 1 and 2.10. Results
Four scores were eliminated as likely errors before
data-analysis was conducted. Three of these were
zero-answers that likely resulted from the participant acci-
dentally clicking submit before choosing his or her esti-
mate (which was done on a sliding bar next to the
submit-button), and one was a very large number in a
sequence of identical low numbers which was also likely
to be due to a mis-click.
The data from the four groups were pooled and the
diversity, average individual error, and collective errorwas calculated for each round for both networks, following
the same procedure outlined for Exp. 1 above. The results
can be seen in Table 3.
As is entailed by the Diversity Prediction Theorem, the
group outperforms the average individual across network
types and rounds, and the difference between the collec-
tive error and the average individual error corresponds to
the group diversity.
For each network type, the diversity, individual error,
and collective error in the ﬁrst round were compared to
the corresponding quantities from every subsequent
round. Paired two-tailed t-tests revealed signiﬁcant
decreases in diversity and average individual error across
all rounds and both network-types (in all cases p < .005).
Comparisons were done across questions and groups (with
resulting df = 39). Table 4 reports the corresponding tests
for collective error. The trends for the three quantitates
across all eight rounds (comparing to round 1) can be seen
in Figs. 3–5.5 As can be seen there is a stable reduction in
collective error only for the small world network condition.
The small world network (but not the complete net-
work) also continued to show improvements for later
rounds: both individual and collective error dropped sig-
niﬁcantly below that of round 2 from round 4 onwards 6,
staying signiﬁcantly below the round 2 levels, barring a blip
in the ﬁnal round for collective error (see Fig. 3).
The pooled data were also analyzed from the perspec-
tive of Hogarth’s equation. The participants’ average validi-
ties (the average correlation between a participant’s
answers and the correct answers), the group’s average
degrees of interpersonal correlation, the validity of the
mean answer for each network (the correlation between
the mean answers and the correct answers), and the pre-
diction of Hogarth’s equation of the validity of the mean
answer were calculated for all three groups. The calcula-
tions of these quantities were done in the same way as
the calculations of error and diversity above. Thus, the
validity of the mean reported here is the mean of the cor-
responding score for each of the four groups. The average
validity corresponds to the mean of the four means for
each of the four groups (encompassing 7, 9, 9 and 13 cor-
relations respectively). Finally, the average degree of inter-
personal correlation was calculated by taking the mean of
four means of the pairwise correlations in each group
(encompassing 21, 36, 36, and 78 correlations respec-
tively). The results can be seen in Table 5.
Fig. 3. Experiment 2: Collective error trends. Displayed are, by round and
network, the error of the mean across all participants (n = 38), on a given
question, averaged across all 10 questions.
Fig. 4. Experiment 2: Individual error trends. Displayed are the mean
individual errors, averaged across participants (n = 38) and question
(n = 10), for each round and network type.
Fig. 5. Experiment 2: Diversity trends. Displayed is the mean variance in
participants’ answers, averaged across 10 questions, for each round and
network type.
Table 5
Experiment 2: Correlations; means.
Network type Rnd Avg. val. Avg.
int. corr.
Val. of
M. A
Hog.
pred.
Complete 1 .765 .690 .898 .921
Complete 2 .850 .832 .921 .932
Complete 3 .855 .848 .918 .929
Complete 4 .863 .858 .924 .932
Complete 5 .867 .864 .924 .933
Complete 6 .863 .871 .916 .925
Complete 7 .868 .873 .921 .929
Complete 8 .866 .863 .923 .932
Small World 1 .764 .640 .917 .955
Small World 2 .843 .758 .942 .967
Small World 3 .852 .769 .946 .971
Small World 4 .878 .808 .951 .977
Small World 5 .881 .815 .951 .976
Small World 6 .879 .815 .950 .974
Small World 7 .884 .822 .952 .974
Small World 8 .877 .815 .947 .972
Fig. 6. Validity of the mean answer. Displayed for each network type, and
across rounds, is the average, across the four groups, of the correlation
between the set of true answers and the mean estimates of the
participants in a group on each of the 10 questions.
Fig. 7. Average validities. Displayed for each network type, and across
rounds, is the mean across the four groups of the average individual
correlation between participant estimates in that group and true answers.
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types, Hogarth’s Eq. (2) predicted the validity of the mean
answer with a high degree of accuracy. The overall degree
of correlation between the validity of the mean answer and
the predicted validity was very high (.93). The accuracy
of the equation was comparable across the two network
types. As is entailed by the equation, the mean validityoutperformed the average individual validity across
rounds and network-structures. The trends for the three
relevant quantities can be seen in Figs. 6–8. As can be seen
there is a stable reduction in collective error only for the
small world network condition.
Fig. 8. Interpersonal correlation. Displayed, for each network type and
across rounds, is the mean of the pairwise correlations between partic-
ipants within each of the four groups-averaged across all four groups.
Fig. 9. Experiment 2: Excess correlation trends. Displayed are the means
of the normalized excess correlation between participants within each of
the four groups, averaged across groups. Error bars correspond to ±1 SD.
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measure of excess correlation, and the result can be seen in
Fig. 9. The complete network increased more in excess cor-
relation (+.1691) than did the small world network
(+.0353). A two-tailed t-test on the ﬁnal round revealed a
highly signiﬁcant difference between the excess correla-
tion in the complete network and the small world network,
t ¼ 9:75ð169Þ; p < :000001.11. Discussion
Experiment 2 replicates the results from Experiment 1
with respect to diversity and average individual error.
Both quantities were signiﬁcantly lowered in every round
following the ﬁrst one. Moreover, the small-world net-
work, but not the complete network, showed a signiﬁcant
decrease in collective error for every round after the sec-
ond one. This conﬁrms the idea suggested by the
Diversity Prediction Theorem, that by restricting informa-
tion ﬂow in a group, and thus preventing excessive
decreases in diversity, one can generate a group structure
such that both the average individual error and the group
error is signiﬁcantly reduced. The mechanism behind this,
and the reason that the complete network did not decrease
collective error to the same degree as the small worldnetwork, can be seen at work in Figs. 3–5. From these it
can be seen that even though the individual error is com-
parable between the complete and the small-world net-
work (Fig. 4), the diversity drops much lower in the
complete network than in the small-world network
(Fig. 5). The net effect of this, as entailed by the Diversity
Prediction Theorem, is a bigger drop in collective error in
the small-world network than in the complete network
(Fig. 3).
The experiment thus constitutes an even stronger
rebuttal of the seeming scepticism of Lorenz et al. (2011)
concerning communication than did the ﬁrst experiment,
by showing that social interaction is consistent with signif-
icant decreases in both the average individual error and
collective error.
From a correlational perspective, Experiment 2 also
replicates Experiment 1 by again demonstrating the pre-
dictive accuracy of Hogarth’s equation. Moreover, our mea-
sure of excess correlation now reveals an even bigger gap
between the complete network and the small-world net-
work than in Experiment 1. This conﬁrms the results of
Exp. 1 concerning the difference between the two network
types. Given the very small increase in excess correlation
(less than 4%) for the small world network, the measure
of excess correlation indicates that, for this network struc-
ture, virtually all of the increase in correlation between
participants (and the corresponding reduction in diversity)
occurs as a mathematically necessary by-product of the
increase in individual accuracy. By contrast, a considerable
proportion of the inter-correlation that arises within the
complete network is unrelated to the true answers to the
questions.
In short, even though participants have more informa-
tion to draw on in the complete network condition, this,
if anything, hurts rather than helps the accuracy of their
judgments. Note that this is not because participants can-
not or do not incorporate more than a handful of pieces
of evidence (cf. Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). That participants
are not ignoring the additional information from others in
the complete network is apparent from the very fact that
their judgments become correlated to a greater extent in
the complete network condition than in the small world
network, even though these increases are not necessitated
by individual accuracy. Participants are sensitive to the
extra information available in the complete network con-
dition, but that sensitivity, to a good extent, merely serves
to amplify noise.
Finally, there is an interesting tension with respect to
individual and collective error that arises from partici-
pants’ speciﬁc use of others’ information. As already
observed in Exp. 1 above, participants in our study
over-weight their own opinions, in keeping with previous
ﬁndings in the literature on advice (e.g., Yaniv &
Milyavsky, 2007), that is, they seemingly give more weight
to their own estimate than they do to others. Participants
in the complete network condition could have fairly easily
(roughly) calculated the mean answer, and, on average, if
they had adopted this answer, their individual accuracies
would have been much higher (e.g., for round 2 this would
have meant a drop in average individual error by 237.7
rather than 152.4). However, had they done so, they would
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collective improvement that they did in fact obtain.7 In
other words, over-weighting of their own opinions led par-
ticipants to less accurate individual responses than they
could have otherwise obtained, but it is only due to that
selective weighting that collective competence improved.12. General discussion
We have provided what is, to the best of our knowledge,
the ﬁrst experimental study into the effects of network
structure on the accuracy of group judgments in estima-
tion tasks as they have long been a focus of interest, from
Galton’s classic (1907) study which prompted subsequent
interest in the wisdom of crowds, through the extensive
body of work on the impact of group deliberation on per-
formance in social psychology between 1930 and 1970
(see e.g., Hill, 1982).
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd clear evidence of effects of network
structure on both collective and individual accuracy,
whereby less densely connected groups outperform groups
where every members’ judgments are accessible to all.
However, in all groups we ﬁnd clear evidence against the
claim (Lorenz et al., 2011) that access to others’ judgments
is detrimental to performance because of the reduction in
diversity that it brings, as we found that individuals’ aver-
age accuracy rose in response to information about others’
estimates (supporting Farrell, 2011). Moreover, in the less
densely connected networks even collective competence
rose as a result of information exchange. Though collective
competence (wisdom of the crowd) is necessarily a func-
tion of both individual competence and group diversity,
less fully connected groups may increase individual accu-
racy sufﬁciently to offset the decrease in diversity informa-
tion exchange brings about.
The need to add a further moderating factor—network
structure—to the already complicated picture of when
group inﬂuence is good or bad may, at ﬁrst glance, seem
worrying. However, we hope also to have shown that there
is a wealth of formal tools, both from the literature on the
aggregation of opinion and the literature on social net-
works, that may proﬁtably be combined to make questions
about group inﬂuence more tractable than they have been
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All questions pertain to the year 2011 unless otherwise
stated.7 We thank Igor Volzhanin for this observation.A.1. Experiment 1WU What percent of the Swedes are 15–24 years?
(13%)S1 What percent of Sweden is covered by
agricultural land? (7.6%)S2 What percent of Swedish university students
study a humanities subject? (15.4%)S3 What percent of the Swedes have undergone
higher education? (24%)S4 What percent of the Swedes who entered the
university in 2011 have at least one university
educated parent? (35%)S5 What percent of energy use in Sweden is
renewable? (48%)S6 What percent of the Swedes roam in the forest
more than 5 times a year? (55.5%)S7 What percent of Swedish men aged 35–44 are
overweight? (61%)S8 What percent of the Swedes between 15–74
have or are looking for work? (71%)S9 What percent of the electorate Swedes voted in
parliamentary elections in 2010? (84.6%)S10 What percent of Swedish Internet users over
12 years have ever used Google? (97%)R1 What percent of Sweden’s surface is developed?
(2.9%)R2 What percent of the Swedes live in Skåne
county? (13.2%)R3 What percent of the deceased in Sweden died of
tumors? (25%)R4 What percent of crimes in Sweden are solved?
(39%)R5 What percent of newly admitted graduate
students at Lund University are women? (44.4%)R6 What percent of Sweden is covered by forest?
(53.1%)R7 What percent of the Swedes aged 16–84 went
for a holiday for at least one week? (60%)R8 What percent of the deceased in Sweden were
over 75 years? (72%)R9 What percent of Swedish children in their sixth
school-year are vaccinated against polio? (96%)R10 What percent of the electorate Swedes took part
in the referendum on the introduction of the
euro in 2003? (82.6%)C1 What percent of Swedish women have Anna as
their given name? (2.3%)C2 What percent of those starting the university
have a foreign background? (17%)C3 What percent of Swedish adolescents aged 15–24
are unemployed? (22.9%)C4 What percent of the Swedes are married?
(33.9%)C5 What percent of the vote in parliamentary
elections in 2010 went to the Alliance? (49.3%)C6 What percent of Swedish MPs are men? (55%)
C7 What percent of Swedish boys between 13–15
years engage in sports at least once a week? (62%)
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have received at least one dose of the
HPV-vaccine? (78%)C9 What percent of the children who completed
their ninth school-year passed Swedish,
mathematics and English? (87.2%)C10 What percent of Swedish girls aged 10–12 years
have their own room? (92%)A.2. Experiment 2WU What percent of the Swedes are 15–24 years?
(13%)1 What percent of Swedish women have Anna as
their given name? (2.3%)2 What percent of those starting the university
have a foreign background? (17%)3 What percent of the Swedes are married?
(33.9%)4 What percent of the vote in parliamentary
elections in 2010 went to the Alliance? (49.3%)5 What percent of Swedish MPs are men? (55%)
6 What percent of Swedish boys between 13–
15 years engage in sports at least once a week?
(62%)7 What percent of Swedish girls born 1999–2001
have received at least one dose of the
HPV-vaccine? (78%)8 What percent of the children who completed
their ninth school-year passed Swedish,
mathematics and English? (87.2%)9 What percent of the Swedes live in Skåne
county? (13.2%)10 What percent of the deceased in Sweden died of
tumors? (25%)11 What percent of newly admitted graduate
students at Lund University are women? (44.4%)12 What percent of Sweden is covered by forest?
(53.1%)13 What percent of the Swedes aged 16–84 went
for a holiday for at least one week? (60%)14 What percent of Swedish children in their sixth
school-year are vaccinated against polio? (96%)15 What percent of Sweden is covered by
agricultural land? (7.6%)16 What percent of energy use in Sweden is
renewable? (48%)17 What percent of the Swedes roam in the forest
more than 5 times a year? (55.5%)18 What percent of the Swedes between 15–74
have or are looking for work? (71%)19 What percent of the electorate Swedes voted in
parliamentary elections in 2010? (84.6%)20 What percent of Swedish Internet users over
12 years have ever used Google? (97%)Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.cognition.2015.04.013.References
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